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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ALTERNATIVE DAMAGE RULES FOR
BREACH OF CONTRACT*
DAVID D. FRIEDMAN
University of Chicago Law School

I.

INTRODUCTION

I

ORDER six gross of customized battens from you, paying in advance.
Before the delivery date I call you up and cancel the order. How much of
the price should you be obliged to give back to me, and how much are you
entitled to keep as compensation for my refusal to fulfill my half of the
purchase contract? More generally, what is the appropriate rule for determining the damages for breach of contract?
In discussions of this question, both in the traditional legal and the more
recent economic literature, one important issue is whether a buyer who
breaches should be required to reimburse the seller for his lost profit. Put
differently, the question is whether the damages should be sufficient to
make the seller as well off as he would have been if the buyer had not
breached ("expectation damages"), or only as well off as he would have
been if the buyer had not purchased in the first place ("reliance damages"). '
Under the former rule, the seller would refund to the buyer whatever
money was saved by not completing the battens, including anything he
could get for them in their uncompleted condition. He would then be as
well off as if the buyer had not breached the contract-he would receive
his expectation. Under the latter rule, the seller would figure out how
* I would like to thank the participants in the Law and Economics workshop at the
University of Chicago Law School for helpful comments. I gratefully acknowledge funding
from the John M. Olin Foundation and the Center for the Study of the Economy and the
State, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(a),(b) (1981). The reliance rule is so called
because the seller is compensated for costs, such as the cost of producing customized goods
which cannot be resold, incurred because he was relying on the buyer to accept what he had
ordered.
[Journal of Law & Economics, vol. XXXII (October 1989)]
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much he had spent so far on producing the battens net of what he could
sell them for. That sum, called his reliance, would be subtracted from
what he had been paid, and the remainder would be returned to the buyer.
The seller, having been compensated for the cost of having the contract
made and broken, would be as well off as if the battens had never been
ordered.
Much of the literature on damage rules for breach of contract argues
that an expectation rule leads to an economically more efficient result
than does a reliance rule and that damages should therefore include compensation for the seller's lost profits. 2 This article argues that that conclusion is mistaken. Where the two rules lead to different results, there is no
general reason to prefer the rule that reimburses the seller for his lost
profits. In some cases, that rule produces a less efficient outcome than the
alternative. In general, which rule is more efficient depends on the details
of the particular situation.
In order to focus on the lost-profits issue, I am deliberately avoiding a
number of the complications discussed in the literature, such as how to
measure the amount of damage 3 and how to prevent the damage rule from
generating inefficient levels of reliance. 4 In all of the examples I will
consider, the amount of reliance is fixed; it cannot be varied by either
party. I assume that buyers and sellers are risk neutral, that the market
interest rate is zero, that the court can costlessly measure the producer's
costs, and that resale by the buyer is prohibitively costly. I limit my
discussion to contracts to purchase goods or services, and further limit it
to cases in which reliance is by the seller and the decision to breach is
made by the buyer. The applicability of the conclusions to a much wider
range of situations will, I think, be clear.
As has been pointed out by a number of writers, 5 the issue of lost profits
2 Thus, for instance, the third sentence of Goetz & Scott, Measuring Sellers' Damages:
The Lost-Profits Puzzle, 31 Stanford L. Rev. (1979) reads: "The answer seems simple: The
seller should be awarded damages sufficient to place it in the same economic position it
would have enjoyed had the buyer performed the contract." The most careful and detailed
analysis of the case for expectation damages that I have seen is Steven Shavell, Damage
Measures for Breach of Contract, II Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980).
For instance, Goetz & Scott, note 2 supra.
4 This is one of the central issues of Shavell, note 2 supra. Consider a situation where the
seller is choosing between two alternative production technologies, one of which results in
lower production costs than the other if the goods are produced, but higher reliance costs if
the order is canceled. If the seller knows that, in case of breach, he will be compensated for
any reliance costs, he will choose his optimal technology as if the probability of breach were
zero; the result is an inefficiently high level of reliance.
5 The first reference to this point that I have come across is in Fuller & Perdue, The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 Yale L. J. 52 (1936). See also Goetz & Scott,
note 2 supra. Cooter & Eisenberg, in Damages for Breach of Contract, 73 Calif. L. Rev.
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only arises when there are profits to lose. Under conditions of perfect
competition, price normally equals marginal cost; the producer is indifferent between selling and not selling an additional unit. In this case, the
damage rule "make the seller as well off as if the purchaser had not
breached" leads to the same result as the rule "make the seller as well off
as if the purchaser had not bought." 6
The issue of lost profits arises when, for some reason, price is not equal
to marginal cost. One such situation, imperfect competition, is analyzed
in Part III of this article and another, perfect competition with uncertain
cost, in Part IV. Part V summarizes the conclusions.
II.

THE CASE FOR LOST PROFITS AND WHAT IS WRONG WITH IT

The argument in favor of an expectation rule can be stated very simply.
An individual will breach a contract if his private benefits from breach are
1434, 1449 (1985), point out that the argument that there are no profits applies only to a
marginal sale. They argue that expectation and reliance damages become equal (under
perfect competition) only as the probability of breach approaches zero. Their argument is
based not on the fact that in competitive equilibrium there are no profits to be lost but on the
fact that in competitive equilibrium the demand curve faced by a firm is perfectly elastic: if
the firm did not make one sale (the one that is going to be breached), it could have made
another. The argument may be summarized as follows:
"The seller contracts to produce a good at a price P. He produces it, but buyer refuses to
take delivery. In a competitive market, if the seller had not made that contract he would
have made an identical contract instead. That contract would have been fulfilled with a
probability I - p, where p is the probability of breach. As p approaches zero, the result of
reliance damages (making the seller as well off as if he had made another contract with
probability I - p of fulfillment) approach those of expectation damages (making the seller as
well off as if he had made this contract and it had been fulfilled). As long as p > 0, reliance
damages are less than expectation damages."
The mistake in this is that it ignores the damage payment that the seller would receive if he
made another contract and it was breached. Let D be the damages for breach of contract,
whether for the actual contract or the hypothetical replacement contract, and rr the net gain
to a firm of making a contract and having it fulfilled. If the firm had made another contract, it
would have had a probability I - p of fulfillment with gain 7r and a probability p of breach,
with gain D, so reliance damages require that
D = (I - p)r + pD,

.. D - pD

(I - p)D = (I - p)tr,
",.D = 7r.

So the seller is entitled to recover his lost profits, just as with the expectation rule, even if
P $0.
6 This article is concerned with damage rules in situations where reliance and expectation

lead to different results. The distinction between reliance and expectation rules might also
be of interest in situations where the two rules, properly applied, lead to the same result, but
one is easier to apply than the other. It might, for instance, be easier to measure the price of
a good and the cost of completing it and calculate expectation damages as the difference
between the two than to calculate the cost of reliance.
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greater than his private costs. He ought to breach (from the standpoint of
economic efficiency) if social benefits-total benefits to everyone affected, himself included-are greater than social costs. The seller's lost
profit is one of the costs of breach. By requiring the purchaser to bear this
cost in the form of damages, we add it to the private costs which go into
his decision. If his benefit from breach is still greater than his cost, then
he ought to breach-doing so produces a net gain-and he will. If not,
he ought not to, and will not. So including the seller's lost profits in the
damages leads to efficient breach.7
While this rule leads to efficient breach, it does not follow that it is an
efficient rule. The damage rule sets the cost of breaching the contract and
thus the buyer's incentive to avoid doing so. There are, however, two
ways of avoiding breach. One is not to breach the contract and the other is
not to sign it in the first place. The expectation rule provides the right
8
incentive on only one of the two margins.
In some circumstances, as we shall see in Parts III and IV, the purchase
price provides the correct incentive on the other margin, making the
argument for expectation damages a valid one. In other circumstances it
does not. In the latter case, there are advantages to both the reliance and
the expectation rules; which is preferable depends on the details of the
situation.
III.

IMPERFECT COMPETITION

This part of the article analyzes the effect of different damage rules
under circumstances of imperfect competition, concentrating on the simple case of a single-price monopoly. In order to make this analysis, more
than the direct effect of the rule on the decision to breach or not to breach
must be considered. If a purchaser knows that circumstances may arise in
which he will want to breach the contract, then a change in the damage
7 This argument appears in verbal form in Cooter & Eisenberg, note 5 supra, and more
formally in Shavell, note 2 supra. Its first statement may be in John H. Barton, The Eco-

nomic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, I J. Legal Stud. 277 (1972).
' I have been able to find only two articles in which the effect of the damage rule on the
formation of the initial contract plays an important role. One is Peter Diamond & E. Masking, An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States, 10 Bell J.
Econ. 282 (1979). It analyzes a very different problem from the one discussed here. Potential
contract partners are involved in a stochastic search process; breach occurs when a searcher
finds someone with whom he can form a better contract than the one he already has. The
other is Barton, note 7 supra. On pages 296-99 he analyzes, if I correctly understand him, a
situation which combines bilateral monopoly and asymmetric information. He does not
assume rational expectations-the worse-informed party appears to act on an assumption
which is wrong on average as well as in the particular case.
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rule, like a change in price, affects whether and how much he buys,
shifting his demand curve. A change in the damage rule also changes the
seller's profit function by affecting how much he gets in case of breach.
The result is to alter the monopolist's profit-maximizing price, the quantity initially ordered, and the quantity ultimately consumed. All of these
effects must be taken into account in deciding which damage rule to
prefer.
In the case of imperfect competition, an expectation-damages rule fixes
only part of the problem. The purpose of the rule is to give the consumer
the right incentive to breach or not to breach. But the consumer still has
the wrong incentive to buy or not to buy. The efficient rule for that
decision is to buy if the value of a unit of the good to the consumer is
greater than the cost of producing it. The rule the consumer will follow,
however, is to buy if the value is greater than the price. If the price of the
good is greater than the cost of producing it, the consumer will sometimes
fail to buy even though, from the standpoint of economic efficiency, he
should-whenever the value of the good to him is more than its marginal
cost but less than its price. This inefficiency is the traditional economic
argument against monopoly. If the price were not greater than the cost of
production, expectation and reliance rules would yield the same result, so
the inefficiency of monopoly pricing is intimately related to the evaluation
of the two rules.
The same fact-price greater than cost-that makes the consumer buy
too little also, under reliance damages, makes him breach too often. The
consumer fails to buy if, at the time of purchase, the value to him of the
good is less than its price. He fails to take delivery if, between the time of
purchase and the time of breach, something happens that lowers the
good's value to him below its price. In both cases, the efficient decision
would be to consume the good if its value is greater than the marginal cost
of producing it.
The argument that implies that efficient breach requires the consumer
to pay damages equal to lost profits if he breaches also implies that he
should pay the same damages if he fails to purchase in the first place. That
decision also results in lost profit to the seller, and will be made efficiently
only if that cost is taken into account by the buyer.
Single-Price Monopoly
The argument can be made more concrete by applying it to a specific
case. Assume a producer with a monopoly of a particular good. His
marginal cost curve is horizontal; for simplicity, fixed cost is assumed to
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be zero. He sells at a single price to a large number of identical consumers. Units are customized; a unit produced for one consumer cannot be
resold to another. 9
The good is produced in a two-step process. The first stage, which
occurs after the order but before the consumer decides whether to breach,
costs the producer R per unit; this is his reliance. If the contract is
breached, the unit is junked; it has no scrap value.'o Completing the good
costs an additional MC - R per unit.
Each consumer faces an uncertain future. There is a probability p that,
between the time he orders and the time he takes delivery, an event will
occur that will lower the good's value to him. The event occurs separately
for each consumer and the probabilities are independent; since there are
many consumers, the fraction for whom the event does occur will be very
close to p. In Figures 1-7, p is .5.
Each consumer's total value function for the good is TV (Q) if the event
does not occur and TV 2 (Q) if it does; the corresponding marginal-value
functions are MVI and MV 2. Since the event lowers the value of the good,
we assume that MV 2 is below MV, for all values of Q. MV1,2 are assumed
continuous and monotonically decreasing.
We consider two possible damage rules: reliance and expectation.
Under the reliance rule, a consumer who takes delivery of fewer units
than he ordered must reimburse the seller only for his reliance; the seller
refunds to the buyer P - R for each unit that the buyer has decided he
does not want. Under the expectation rule, the consumer receives back
only MC - R for each unit he chooses not to accept. In this case, the
penalty for breach is the difference between the contract price and the
cost of completing the good-the breaching consumer must reimburse
the seller for his lost profits.
I will show that the problem defined by TVI, TV 2 , and R can be converted, under either rule, into an equivalent problem with new total value
9 An example of a real firm that comes fairly close to fitting the description of this section
would be an elite university such as Harvard or MIT. It has a considerable degree of
monopoly since, as any (Harvard) man will gladly explain, there is no substitute for a
Harvard education. Many students drop out before receiving their degrees for personal
reasons which, from the university's standpoint, may be viewed as random events. Unlike
the firms analyzed here, however, universities engage in extensive discriminatory pricing.
There is also some question whether they behave like profit-maximizing firms.
10 More generally, R represents whatever costs the producer bears as a result of a consumer ordering and then canceling. These might include modifying a customized unit to
resell, finding a customer for a unit that was not customized, or simply adjusting to the
additional uncertainty due to one consumer being willing to breach one more unit if the event
occurs. If the good is not customized and the number of customers is large, this last case
should involve a very small R, due to the law of large numbers.
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curves, TV*, TV*, and zero reliance. By solving that problem in the case
where MV * and MV * are parallel straight lines, a situation that happens
to lead to a particularly simple solution, I will show, for each rule, that
there exist circumstances in which that rule produces the superior outcome.
Reliance Damages
We start with reliance damages. The consumer orders a quantity Q1. If
the event does not occur, he accepts delivery and receives a benefit
TVI(Q,) at a cost PQ,. If the event does occur, he breaches a quantity
equal to (Q1 - Q2), consumes Q2, and receives a benefit TV 2 (Q 2 ) at a cost
PQ2 + R(Q - Q2); the final term is the damage payment. If NB, is the
consumer's net benefit under a reliance rule,'' we have
NBr(Qi, Q2) = (I - p)[TVI(Q1) - PQ]
+ p[TV 2 (Q 2 ) - PQ 2 ] - pR(Q, -

(I)
Q2).

The consumer chooses Q1, Q2 to maximize NB,. He does so subject to the
constraint Q, -_ Q2, since he does not have the option of ordering Q, at a
price P and then breaching a negative quantity by ordering additional
units at a cost of P - R.
I consider two alternatives: case 1, where the constraint is not binding,
and case 2, where it is. I start with case 1, where
0 = dNBr/dQi = (1 - p)[MVI(Ql) - P] - pR,
.%P = MVI(Q,) - Rp/(l - p) = MV*(Q,),
0 = dNB,/dQ 2 = p[MV 2(Q2 ) - P] + pR,
.%P = MV 2(Q 2 ) + R = MV*(Q,).

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Ordinarily an individual's demand curve is equal to his marginal-value
curve, since he maximizes his net benefit by buying the quantity for which
price equals marginal value. ' 2 We have a similar result here, except that
the demand curve showing the quantity consumed in state 1 (event does
not occur, probability 1 - p) is equal to MV'*(Q,), shifted down from
MVI(QI) by pR/(l - p), while the demand curve for state 2 is the corresponding marginal-value curve shifted up by R.
" Here and elsewhere, benefits and costs are expected values, since both consumers and
producers are assumed risk neutral.
12 Provided that the marginal-value curve is monotonic down, as we have assumed. When
I say that a demand curve equals a marginal-value curve, I mean that they are the same line.
Considered as functions, D shows quantity as a function of price, and MV shows marginal
value as a function of quantity.
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Under the reliance rule, damages for breach just compensate the producer for the cost of producing units that are not accepted; the producer is
in the same position as if the consumer had ordered the number of units
that he ends up accepting. So we have
'T = (1 -

p)Q[(P -

MC) + pQ 2 (P -

MC) = D*(P)(P -

MC),

where
D*(P) = [(1 - p)Q1 + PQ2].

The producer makes the same profit as if he had sold a quantity D*(P) at a
price P. The curve D*(P) is simply the horizontal weighted average of the
demand curves corresponding to MV*I and MV*, with weights (1 - p),

3
p.P_13

So far we have considered the case in which the constraint Q, ->Q2 is
not binding. The consumer orders Q1; if the event occurs, he cancels part
of the order and gets back P - R on each unit canceled. If, however,
MV 2(Q0 > P - R, the consumer will choose not to breach, and equations
(2)-(5) no longer hold. We have instead
NBr(Qi, Q2) = (

- p)TVI(Q 1 ) + pTV 2 (Q)

- PQ 1 ,

Q2 = Q1-

Maximizing NBr with respect to Q, yields
0 = dNBrIdQi
= [(1 - p)MVI(Q,) + pMV2 (Q,)] - P,
P = (1
= (I

-

p)MVI(Q 1) + pMV2 (Qi)

-

p)MV'*(Q) + pMV*(Qi).

(6)

Here the consumer, knowing that he is not going to breach, chooses Q, in
the knowledge that he has a probability 1 - p of getting TVI(QI) and a
probability p of getting TV 2 (Q1 ). His (expected) marginal-value curve,
and therefore his demand curve D*, is the vertical average of MV 1 and
MV 2 with weights I - p, p.
The seller knows that, whether or not the event occurs, he will sell the
quantity calculated from that demand curve, so he picks his price to
13 The curve D* is the (average) demand curve for one customer; for N customers the
demand curve should be D* multiplied N times in the horizontal direction. Profit is then also
multiplied by N. Similarly, consumer surplus should be multiplied by N since there are N
identical consumers. Conclusions about what rule maximizes the sum of profit and consumer surplus are unaffected, so we can ignore these points and proceed as if N were equal
to one with no loss of generality.
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Reliance Damages: p=.5
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D*=quantity consumed as a
function of price

'

~................,

.4.--.---D*=Hrontal Average
(Case 1)

~

.4-.D*=Vetical Average
(Case 2)

44--D*Hriea

Average 4-

(Case 1)

FIGURE 1.-Calculating the demand curve faced by a monopoly under a rule of reliance

damages.

maximize his profit on D* in the usual way. The situation is shown on
Figure 1 for p
2.For quantities for which MV*(Q) > MV*(Q), the
constraint QI
Q2 is not binding, and D* is the horizontal weighted
average of MV* and MV *;elsewhere the constraint is binding, and D* is
the vertical weighted average. At the boundary of the two regions MV'
MV2; vertical and horizontal averages are the same, so D* is continuous
at the boundary. In order to maximize his profit, the producer calculates
marginal revenue from D*, intersects it with MC to find the profit-maximizing (average) quantity, and goes up to D* to find the corresponding
price.
I have now converted our original problem, with MV 1 .2 and R > 0, into
a new problem with MV*1. 2 and R = 0; 1 have eliminated R by a shift of the
marginal-value curves. The new problem yields the same demand curve
as the original problem, so the profit-maximizing price, quantity consumed, and profit are the same. From the standpoint of the producer, the
outcome is identical to the outcome of the original problem.
We may rewrite equation (1) as
-

NBr(Ql,Q 2) = (1 - p)[TVI(Q) - RpQI(1 - p) - PQ 1]
+ p[TV2 (Q2) + RQ 2 - PQ2_

(')

= (I - p)[TV*I(Q,) - PQ,] + p[TV*(Q2) - PQ2].
Here TV' 2 are the total-value curves corresponding to the marginal-value
curves MV*12 . The right-hand side of equation (l') is what total benefit
would be if reliance were zero and the marginal value curves were MV*1. 2.
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So the problem defined by MV1, 2 and R = 0 is equivalent to the original
problem from the standpoint of the consumer as well.
Expectation Damages
The analysis for expectation damages is similar. The essential difference is that, since the buyer must reimburse the seller for his lost profit,
he receives back only MC - R for each unit canceled. So his net benefit is
NBe(Qi, Q2) = (1 - p)[TVI(Q1 ) - PQ1]
+ p[TV2 (Q2 ) - PQ2]

(7)

- p[P - (MC - R)](Ql - Q2).
As before, we start by considering the case where, if the event happens,
the consumer chooses to cancel at least part of his order. Maximizing with
respect to Q, and Q2 we have
0 = dNBeIdQt = (1
- p[P - (MC

-

p)[MV 1 (Qi)- P1

(8)

-R)],

P = (I - p)MV I (Q1 ) + p(MC

-

R)

(9)

= (I - p)MV*I(Q,) + pMC,
0 = dNBeIdQ2 = p[MV 2 (Q 2 )
+ p[P - (MC
MC

=

MV2(Q2) + R

P(

(10)

-R),

MV*(Q 2).

(11)

Looking at equation (10), we observe that the optimal value of Q2 does not
depend on P. If the event happens, the consumer cancels Q, - Q2 units,
getting back MC - R on each. He maximizes his net benefit by canceling
back to the point where the marginal value of the last unit equals what he
gets for canceling it.
It is easy to see when the constraint Q, ->Q2 is or is not binding. If the
consumer purchases a quantity Q, such that MV 2 (Q1 ) - MC - R, then
the constraint is not binding (case I); otherwise it is (case 2). In the latter
case, the consumer orders Q, and consumes it all, whether or not the
i7 event occurs.
Under the reliance rule, the producer's profit depended on how much
was consumed. Under the expectation rule, the consumer who chooses to
cancel part of his order must make the producer as well off as if he had not
canceled, so the producer's profit depends only on Q1, the quantity ordered. From equation (9), we know that in case I that quantity is ordered
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for which P = (1 - p)MV*I(Ql) + pMC. So the producer maximizes
his profit by acting as if he were facing a demand curve D* = (1 p)MV*I(Q) + pMC.
In case 2, everything ordered is consumed. The result is the same as in
case 2 under reliance damages. The curve D* is the vertical average of
MV, and MV 2 with weights I - p, p. That is the same as the vertical
average of MV'* and MV* with the same weights.
I have now done the same thing under expectation damages that I
earlier did under reliance damages-converted a problem with MV 1 ,2 and
R > 0 into a new problem with MV1, 2 and R = 0 and shown that the two
problems are equivalent from the standpoint of the producer. Just as in
the earlier case, the final step is to show that the problems are also
equivalent from the standpoint of the consumer. We rewrite equation (7)
as
NBe(Qi Q2) = (1 - p){TV(Q 1) - RpQI(1 - p) - Q[P + (P - MC)p/(1 - p)}
+ p[TV2(Q 2) + RQ 2 + (P - MC)Q 2 - PQ2]

(7')

= (I - p)[TV*I(Q,) + p[TV*(Q 2)] - PQ, + p(MC)(Q1 - Q2).
This is the same net benefit we would get from equation (7) for R = 0,
TV, 2 = TV'. 2. So the new problem is equivalent to the old from the
standpoint of the consumer as well.
Comparing the Two Rules
Figures 1 and 2 show the results from the standpoint of the producer; in
each case, he calculates price, quantity, and profit as if he were faced with
a demand curve D*. To calculate the effect of each damage rule on price
and quantity, we must learn in each case where the marginal-revenue
curve derived from D* intersects MC. Doing so is complicated by the fact
that the two rules imply both different ranges of Qi for which the constraint Q, -> Q2 is binding and, if it is not binding, different relations
between D* and the marginal revenue curves MV1, 2.
Fortunately, the objective is not to prove a general result but to disprove one. My thesis is that neither rule is, in general, superior. To prove
that, it is sufficient to find one class of curves for which reliance damages
lead to a superior outcome and one class for which expectation rules lead
to a superior outcome.
In doing so, we will make use of the results of the previous two sections. The situation we are considering is defined by MV 1 , 2, R, but we will
analyze the equivalent problem defined by MV*. 2 , 0. Since the solutions
to both problems have the same value of NB and r, whichever rule is
superior for one must be superior for the other as well.
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Expectation Damages:p=.S

D*tuatiy rdre

FIGURE 2.-Calculating the demand curve faced by a monopoly under a rule of expectation damages.

It is particularly easy to analyze the situation in which MV* and MV*
are parallel straight lines, since horizontal and vertical averages are then
identical. 4 Three of our four alternatives (reliance case 1 or 2 and expectation case 2) then yield the same D*, which greatly simplifies the comparison of the two rules. That situation is analyzed in Appendix A.
The conclusion of that analysis is that, for a given set of marginal value
curves, there is some MCab such that for MC > MCab the reliance rule is
superior to the expectation rule, and for MC < MCb the expectation rule
is superior to the reliance rule. It follows that neither rule is, in general,
superior.
In working through situations such as that analyzed in Appendix A, it
becomes clear why reliance is sometimes superior to expectation. For a
given quantity ordered, expectation is superior because it results in the efficient quantity breached; units are breached only if their marginal value is
less than the cost of completing them. But for a given quantity consumed,
reliance is superior because it results in the efficient allocation of that
quantity between consumers with MV and consumers with MV-,-the
allocation which makes the marginal value of the last unit consumed the
same for all consumers.15
'4 This is not quite correct; since a marginal-value curve only exists for nonnegative
values of Q, it cannot be a straight line from - - to + x. For sufficiently high values of P,
we have a horizontal average of the high demand curve and zero, which is not equal to a
vertical average of the high and low demand curves. The implications of this are worked out
in Appendix A.
15 This assumes the transformed problem where R = 0. The condition for efficient divi-
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DjI

Vu: Damage Rules as DiscriminatoryPricing

Some readers may suspect that they have seen some of this analysis
somewhere before. They are probably correct. Both the analysis and the
conclusions correspond to a special case of Pigou's third-degree price
discrimination. 16 The seller of the previous section is in the same situation
as a monopolist choosing prices in two separable markets, with the relation between the two prices constrained by the damage rule. The two
markets consist of consumers in situation 1 with demand curve D, = MVI
and consumers in situation 2 with demand curve D-, = MV,. Reliance
damages correspond to a rule forbidding discrimination between the two
markets; expectation damages correspond to a rule requiring the monopolist either to sell the same amount in both markets or to set the price in the
7
market where the lower quantity is purchased equal to marginal cost.'
Viewed as a special case of third-order price discrimination, the results
of the previous section are what one would expect. The standard efficiency argument against price discrimination is that charging the same
price in all markets results in the efficient allocation of a given volume of
output. That is the advantage of reliance damages. The standard efficiency argument for price discrimination is that under some circumstances it results in a larger volume of output, producing a benefit that
more than balances the cost of inefficient allocation. Whether permitting
price discrimination results, on net, in a better or worse outcome than
forbidding it depends on the details of the demand and cost curves-as
suggested by our examples.
Choice of Damages by the Monopolist: The Case against
Freedom of Contract
Figure 3 shows the situation of Figures 1 and 2 with one important
difference: the monopolist is free to set his own damage rule. In keeping
with the discussion of the previous section, the situation is graphed as a
sion between the two situations is more complicated for R > 0, but the reliance rule still
satisfies it-as it must, given that any problem with R > 0 has an equivalent problem with R
- 0, as shown above.
16 A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, part 2, ch. 17 (4th ed. 1950). First-degree price
discrimination is perfect price discrimination; every unit of the good is sold at the highest
price the consumer of that unit will pay, leaving no consumer surplus. Under second-degree
price discrimination, the monopolist sets n different prices and arranges things so that every
unit is sold for the highest of those prices at which the consumer is willing to buy it. Under
third-order price discrimination, the monopolist separates his customers into a number of
different groups and charges a different price to the members of each different group.
17 Here again, the discussion applies directly to the transformed problem with R = 0 and
must be modified to apply to the case R > 0.
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Q2

Q1

Q+

FIGURE 3.-Calculating the profit-maximizing damage rule and quantity, for a monopolist
free to choose both, analyzed as a problem in discriminatory pricing.

problem in discriminatory pricing. The curves MRI, 2 are the marginalrevenue curves corresponding to all customers being in situations 1 and 2,
respectively. The monopolist sells separate quantities QI,2 in the two
"markets," following the usual profit-maximization rule: choose the
quantity for which MC = MR. The total quantity Q+ is the average of the
two since each customer has an equal chance of being in either situation.
Customers in situation I pay price P I ; customers in situation 2 pay price
P 2.

How can this be converted into the language of damages for breach of
contract? We have the prices on the separate margins of situations 1 and
2; it is necessary to deduce the corresponding price P for purchasing the
good and damages D for breaching the contract. Viewed in terms of two
markets, the cost of buying Q, at a price P with a probability of .5 and Q2
at a price P 2 with a probability of .5 is
C(Q,, Q2) = [(PI)QI

+ (P 2 )Q2]/2.

(12)

Viewed in terms of contract and breach, the consumer orders Q, units,
paying P(QI) for them. He then has a 50 percent chance of finding himself
in situation 2, returning (QI - Q2) units, and getting a refund of(P - D)price minus damages.

C(Q1 , Q2) = P(Q j ) - (P - D)(QI - Q2)/2
=

{[2P

-

(P

-

D)]Qt + (P

-
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Equating the coefficients of Q, and
equation (13), we get
P 2 = P - D;

Q2

in equation (12) with those in

=

2P - (P - D) = 2P - P 2.

P

=

(PI + P2 )/2;

D

=

(PI

P,

Solving for P and D gives us

-

P2 )/2.

So the monopolist sells at a price P = (PI + P 2)/2 and charges damages
for breach of (P - P 2 )/2.
A rule of reliance damages corresponds, as pointed out before, to a rule
requiring the monopolist to sell at the same price in both markets. The
monopolist faces a demand curve that is the horizontal average of DI and
D 2. From that demand curve he calculates a marginal-revenue curve
MR +. He maximizes his profit at the quantity at which MR + intersects
MC. The result is shown in Figure 4.
As can be seen from Figure 4, this is the same quantity, Q , as in
Figure 3. The amount produced is the same (for these demand and cost
curves) under a legal rule of freedom of contract, in which the monopolist
picks the damage rule that maximizes his profit, as under a rule in which
damages are zero. The difference is that in the former case the monopo-

FIGURE 4.-Calculating the profit-maximizing quantity for a monopolist under a rule of
reliance damages, analyzed as a problem in discriminatory pricing.
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list, in effect, charges a high price (PI > Pr) to customers in situation I and
a low price (P 2 < Pr) to those in situation 2. So freedom of contract leads
to a less efficient allocation of the same output than does the reliance rule.
What about the expectation rule? The situation shown corresponds to
MC < MCab, as the reader can easily check by comparing Figure 3 with
the figures in Appendix A. That implies that expectation damages are
superior to reliance damages and, hence, also superior to the outcome of
freedom of contract.
So if the monopoly is free to specify damages in its sale contract, the
result may not be the most efficient damage rule. This suggests ajustification for courts refusing to accept damage rules agreed to by the parties,
where one of the parties is a monopoly. That conclusion must be qualified
by the observation that the court may lack the information or the incentives to produce a better rule. Even if the court can choose a better rule, it
may be unable to enforce it; the court, after all, gets to rule on the
contract only if the parties choose to go to court. An attempt to impose a
damage rule other than that which would result from freedom of contract
may merely result in costly-and successful-efforts by the seller to
contract around it.
What if the monopolist is free to choose between the expectation and
reliance rules but not free to set any damage rule he likes? If MC > MCab,
the monopolist operating under an expectation rule chooses to sell a
quantity Qb at a price MVb(Qb). If Q , < Qr, then we know from Figure 5
that MVa(Q',) > MVb(Qb); the monopolist operating under a reliance rule

A -Reliance

Damages

",4

..................

Q=quantity consumed

FIGuas 5.-The analysis of a monopoly selling under a rule of reliance damages, as
modeled in Appendix A. Curves MV, and MR, are shown only for values of Q to the left of
Q,; MVb and MRb are shown only for values of Q to the right of Q,. The demand curve and
the resulting marginal revenue curve faced by the monopolist are identical to the parts of
MV.b and MR..b shown.
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could sell the same quantity at a higher price, yielding a higher profit, so
he would prefer the reliance rule. If Q* > Qr, on the other hand, then a
monopolist operating under a reliance rule could also choose to sell Q , at
a price MVb(Q*). The fact that he maximizes his profit by instead selling
Q* at a price MV(Q*) implies that the reliance rule is again preferred by
the monopolist. Essentially the same argument can be used in the opposite direction for MC < MCb. It follows that for the situation where
MV 1 ,2 are parallel straight lines and R = 0, or for any situation equivalent
to it (remember that any R > 0 situation can be transformed into an
equivalent situation with R = 0), freedom of contract leads to the efficient
choice between expectation and reliance rules. How wide a range of other
situations this result applies to I do not know.
The main purpose of this article is to analyze damage rules from the
standpoint of economic efficiency. There is another way in which what we
have just done can be viewed-one which carries us beyond the subject
of this article and into a more general discussion of monopoly pricing.
One of the implications of this article is that a monopolist may choose to
sell goods in advance and charge damages for breach of contract even
when reliance is zero and breach therefore costs him nothing.
Consider the situation from the standpoint of a monopolist choosing a
damage rule. A reliance damage rule when reliance is zero is equivalent to
letting the consumer decide whether to buy the good after he knows how
much of it he wants. That rule does not maximize the monopolist's profit;
he does better with advance contracts and a penalty for breach of contract. The combination of advance purchase and damages functions not to
prevent inefficient reliance but as a device for price discrimination. It
would be interesting to search for real-world examples of such a phenomenon.
Oligopoly, BilateralMonopoly, and Monopolistic Competition
So far, the analysis has been limited to the case of single-price monopoly, although the breach rule itself can be viewed as equivalent to charging different prices to two different groups of customers. The reason for
concentrating on that case is not that it is the only form of imperfect
competition where price is not equal to marginal cost but that it is the one
most tractable to economic analysis. While I will not attempt any equally
detailed examination of other forms of imperfect competition, it is worth
saying a little about oligopoly, bilateral monopoly, monopolistic competition, and discriminatory pricing.
In the case of both oligopoly and bilateral monopoly, equilibrium price
and quantity are typically indeterminate, which makes it hard to discuss
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the relative efficiency of different rules. One can note that, just as with the
simple monopoly we have discussed, the damage rule will affect the
buyer's incentive to sign the contract as well as his incentive to breach it,
and that both effects should be taken into account in evaluating alternative rules.
A particularly simple case of bilateral monopoly occurs if one party is in
a much better position to commit himself than the other. Suppose, for
instance, that the seller is going to be in similar situations with other
buyers many times, while the buyer will be in such a situation only once.
The seller quotes a price and explains that he will stick to it whatever the
buyer does. He can plausibly argue that to give in to the buyer's insistence on a lower price will weaken his bargaining position in future transactions with other buyers.
If the seller knows the value of the good to the buyer, he sets the price
one cent below the full value and ends up with essentially all of the
surplus. Suppose, however, that the seller has imperfect information
about the buyer, in the form of a cumulative probability distribution
p(P) showing the probability that the value of the good to the buyer is at
least P.
The analysis of this situation is the same as the analysis of an ordinary
single-price monopoly. The function p(P), which shows the probability
that a seller who insists on a price P will sell the good, corresponds to the
demand curve D(P), which shows the number of units of the good the
monopolist can sell at a price P. Marginal cost is the value of the good to
the seller-the price at which he is indifferent between selling and not
selling. Under these circumstances, the seller in bilateral monopoly is
simply a monopolist whose (expected) quantity sold is between zero and
one. The analysis of single-price monopoly carries over intact, and the
conclusion is the same.
While single-price monopoly is the simplest kind of imperfect competition to analyze, monopolistic competition is probably the most important
in the real world. If we limit ourselves to firms that are unable to price
discriminate, the analysis is very much the same. The one difference is
that under monopolistic competition the density of firms is endogenous;
the higher the profit an individual firm is able to get, the more firms crowd
in, driving down the profit. So if two damage rules result in different profit
levels for the same demand curves, they will, in equilibrium, result in
different numbers of firms.
Shavell, Coase, and Perfect DiscriminatoryPricing
Readers familiar with Shavell's 1980 article on damages for breach of
contract may at this point be wondering how its results can be consistent
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with those of this article. Shavell, after considering breach under a variety
of assumptions, concluded that "[tihe expectation measure is Pareto superior to the reliance measure independent of the nature of the contractual situation."'18 He further concluded that, in the situation where the
same party decided about reliance and breach, "the expectation measure
is . . . a perfect substitute for a Pareto efficient complete contingent
contract."' 9 A situation in which one party decides on breach and the
level of reliance is fixed should be a trivial case of the same party deciding
both. It seems to follow that, according to Shavell's analysis, the expectation rule not only dominates the reliance rule, it is the optimal rule for the
cases we have been considering. Yet it seems clear from the analysis in
this article that it is not.
The reason for the discrepancy is that Shavell, in his article, assumes
away the central problem discussed here-the effect of the damage rule
on the quantity initially purchased. He states (in a footnote) that "issues
concerning contract formation (encompassing how parties meet and, if so,
whether they reach agreement) are not studied here." 20 He thus analyzes
different damage rules while ignoring any effect they may have on
whether the good is purchased in the first place. In effect, he assumes that
the quantity initially sold is always efficient-or, at least, equally efficient
under all of the alternative damage rules being considered. Under that
assumption the problem I have been discussing-and, indeed, the standard efficiency problem of monopoly-vanishes. 2 '
One way of defending Shavell's assumption is to assume that the Coase
Theorem applies to the formation of a contract but not to its breach. If the
Coase Theorem applies to making a contract, then we can ignore any
8 Shavell, supra note 2, at 482, proposition 5. This is demonstrated in Shavell's "First
Case," with one party deciding on reliance and the other on breach. As the next quote
shows, he reaches an even stronger result when the same party decides both. In his concluding remarks he qualifies the conclusion somewhat in cases involving risk aversion, and
mentions the possibility that the court may lack the information necessary to apply one or
the other damage measures, but neither of these points has anything to do with the central
argument of this article.
"9 Shavell, supra note 2, at 485.
20 Shavell, supra note 2, at 469 n. 13. Similarly, in Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q. J. Econ. 123 (1984), Shavell writes, "The parties are
assumed already to have met . . . they will make a contract themselves if doing so would
result in a higher expected utility for each than not making any contract, and this will
generally be presumed to be the case."
2' This is also true of the quite different analysis of the problem by William P. Rogerson in
his article, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 Rand J.
Econ. 39 (1984). He eliminates the problem of inefficient breach by assuming that it will
always be solved by ex post negotiations between the two parties. His analysis hinges on the
effect that the expectation of such renegotiation has on the level of reliance chosen by one
party; he concludes, like Shavell, that expectation damages are superior to reliance damages. Also like Shavell, he ignores in his analysis any effect that the damage rule will have on
whether the initial contract occurs and at what price.
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effect of damage rules on what contracts get made; whatever the damage
rule, all contracts that produce net gains-and only such contracts-will
be signed. If the Coase Theorem also applied to breaching a contract, we
could ignore damage rules there as well; whatever the rule, only efficient
breach would occur. But if the Coase Theorem does not apply to breach,
then damage rules affect the decision to breach and the expectation rule
leads to the efficient outcome.
While this is a possible set of assumptions, it does not seem a particularly plausible one. There is no particular reason why, if buyer and seller
can bargain to an efficient outcome in drawing up the original contract,
they cannot also bargain to an efficient outcome when one party wishes to
breach. It seems more reasonable to assume that the Coase Theorem
applies to both parts of the transaction or neither. In the former case, the
outcome is always efficient and the damage rule is irrelevant. In the latter
case, which we have been assuming in this article, both formation and
breach are conducted without individual bargaining. The result is the
standard textbook model of monopoly. The seller sets one price at which
all customers may buy. The buyer decides whether to breach according to
the costs implied by the applicable legal rule.
Shavell does not discuss whether the market he is discussing is competitive or monopolistic or why expectation and reliance rules lead to different results. He is concerned with the situation only after the contract has
been formed-at which point those questions are no longer relevant.
Another way of justifying his approach might be to assume that the market he discusses is a competitive one and to argue that under perfect
competition the market price already reflects any cost that the buyer may
impose on the seller by buying with some probability of breaching. With
the quantity on one margin optimized by the price, one can then use an
expectation-damages rule to optimize the quantity on the other margin.
In the next section, I will show to what degree that argument holds.
Before doing so, it is worth noting that there is at least one form of
imperfect competition for which the assumption necessary to Shavell's
analysis is correct and to which his conclusions therefore apply.
In the usual monopoly context of one seller and many buyers, Shavell's
assumption would be true if the seller engaged in perfect discriminatory
pricing-charging each buyer for each unit the highest price he is willing
to pay. Under perfect discriminatory pricing the quantity produced is efficient, since the seller can and will cut price on marginal units all the way
down to marginal cost without losing revenue on his higher priced inframarginal units. Under such circumstances, freedom of contract would
lead to expectation damages and would be efficient. The seller would
choose the damage rule that set the marginal cost to the consumer in
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situation 2 at its efficient level (MC), and set the purchase price (differently for each unit sold to each consumer) at the level that collected all of
the resulting surplus.
IV.

PERFECT COMPETITION WITH UNCERTAIN COST

So far, we have only considered imperfect competition. Reliance and
expectation rules lead to different conclusions because price is not equal
to marginal cost; price is not equal to marginal cost because the market is
not competitive.
A difference between price and marginal cost might also arise in a
perfectly competitive market with uncertainty, where the seller discovered his production cost only after contracting to produce the good. The
contract price would equal average cost ex ante, so average profits would
be zero. By the time the buyer decides whether to breach, however, both
parties would know the actual cost of completing the good. Since it would
generally not equal the contract price, a reliance rule would produce a
different result than an expectation rule.
In choosing between the two rules, one crucial question is who knows
what when. In the case of symmetric information, where, at the time the
contract is signed, both buyer and seller have the same information about
the probability of cost and of breach, it is simple to show that expectation
damages not only are superior to reliance damages but result in an efficient outcome. 22 In other situations, the advantage of an expectation rule
(efficient incentive for the buyer to breach) must be balanced against the
advantage of a reliance rule (efficient incentive for the buyer to include
the cost of ordering and then breaching when he decides how much to
order). But with symmetric information the seller has the same information about the potential costs of sale followed by breach as the buyer, so
those costs are fully reflected in the purchase price, leading to an efficient
quantity ordered even under an expectation rule.
If all sellers know (and buyers do not know) the cost of producing units
for a particular buyer, then in a competitive market the varying costs will
be reflected in the prices charged to different buyers; price equals cost ex
post as well as ex ante, and the distinction between expectation and
reliance damages vanishes.
Finally, consider the case where the buyer knows more than the seller
22 The proof is contained in a longer version of this article available from the author. By
describing an outcome as efficient, I mean that no better outcome can be produced given the
information available when the relevant decisions are made. I am still assuming a fixed level
of reliance; with variable reliance the outcome may be inefficient, for reasons explored in

Shavell, note 2 supra.
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about the cost of production, perhaps because what is being sold is work
on material provided by the buyer-repairing a car or a house, for example, or educating a child. 23 In this case, as in the earlier discussion of
imperfect competition, expectation damages give the correct incentive to
breach a contract but the wrong incentive to sign it. Under expectation
damages, a buyer who cancels is refunded what the seller saves by not
producing the good. A high-cost buyer-a buyer who knows that producing units for him will be unusually costly-also knows that if he chooses
to cancel he will receive a large refund. He is getting a more attractive
package-the same price and a lower penalty if he decides to cancelthan a low-cost buyer. The result, under expectation damages, is that a
high-cost buyer orders more than a low-cost buyer-the precise opposite
of the efficient pattern. Under a reliance rule, high-cost and low-cost
buyers pay the same damages and purchase the same quantity.24
A reliance rule gives buyers the efficient incentive with regard to ordering the units they are going to breach. Buying and then breaching imposes
a cost of R (the amount of reliance) on the seller, which is what the buyer
must pay as damages. Under either reliance or expectation, the buyer still
has an inefficient incentive with regard to ordering units he is going to
accept. All buyers are charged a price reflecting the average cost of producing for both high-cost and low-cost customers, so high-cost customers
buy more than the efficient quantity and low-cost customers less. 25 Once a
unit is ordered, the reliance rule gives high-cost customers an inefficiently
high and low-cost customers an inefficiently low incentive to breach; the
expectation rule gives the correct incentive. The analysis is worked out
formally in Appendix B.
The conclusion here, as in the discussion of imperfect competition, is
that there are advantages to both rules. The reliance rule gives the buyer
the correct incentive to avoid breaching a contract by not signing it-or,
more generally, to take into account the cost of buying and then breaching
23 Here again, a university is a good real-world example; both a student and his parents

are likely to have some private information about the probability that he will drop out.
24 It might seem more natural to consider situations in which the buyer's special knowledge concerned probability of breach rather than cost of production. But if cost of production is known ex ante, then there are no profits ex post, so reliance and expectation rules
imply the same damages. With uncertain costs but symmetrical knowledge about them, the
expectation rule is superior even if the buyer has special information about the probability of
breach since under the expectation rule the seller does not care whether or not the buyer
breaches, and the seller is therefore uninterested in the probability of breach.
25 This is the same problem known as adverse selection in the context of insurance
markets. In that case, the problem is made worse by the fact that the good is more valuable
to high-cost (that is, high-risk) customers and less valuable to low-cost customers, with the
result that if the seller charges the average cost, high-cost customers buy more than low-cost
customers, raising the average cost.
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in deciding how much to buy. The expectation rule gives the buyer the
correct incentive to avoid breach by fulfilling the contract once it is entered into.
Under both perfect and imperfect competition, we can expect one rule
to be unambiguously superior to the other if we have some reason to
expect that one decision or the other-the decision to buy or the decision
to breach-will be made efficiently under both rules. Under imperfect
competition, the decision to buy is made efficiently with perfect discriminatory pricing or perfect Coase Theorem bargaining; in those situations
expectation damages are unambiguously superior. Under perfect competition, the same is true for symmetric information. Similarly, under
perfect competition, reliance damages are superior for all-or-nothing
breach-the situation where, if the event which might trigger breach occurs, the value of the good drops to zero and the purchaser breaches the
entire contract under either rule.26
V.

CONCLUSION

In this article, I have tried to establish two things. The first is that, in
order to evaluate different damage rules correctly, one must consider
their effect on the decision to buy as well as on the decision to breach,
since failing to sign a contract is one way of avoiding damages for breaching. The second is that, once one includes that effect, the case for the
general superiority of expectation damages disappears.
In establishing these results, I have looked at two large classes of
problems-imperfect competition and perfect competition with uncertain
costs. Within each class, I have tried to establish general principles by
looking at a variety of possible situations.
In the case of imperfect competition, one conclusion is that the analysis
of damage rules can be viewed as an application of the theory of thirdorder discriminatory pricing. A rule of reliance damages is like a rule
prohibiting discriminatory pricing; the arguments for the efficiency of
reliance damages, and the limitations to those arguments, are the same as
for the efficiency of a prohibition on price discrimination.
In discussing perfect competition I have limited myself to situations in
which production cost is uncertain, since with perfect competition and
full information there are no profits to be lost and expectation and reliance
rules therefore yield the same damages. The results of the analysis then
depend on whether buyer and seller have the same information.
26 This case is discussed briefly in Appendix B. Under single-price monopoly, all-ornothing breach results in identical outcomes under both damage rules.
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In the case of symmetric information, the market price includes all the
information about costs of breach available at the time the contract is
signed. There is no advantage to reliance damages since at the time when
the buyer is deciding how much to order he knows nothing relevant to
breach that the seller does not. The results of Shavell can then be expected to hold, just as they can be expected to hold for perfect price
discrimination and for the same reason.
If the buyer knows more about the cost of production than the seller,
however, inefficient ordering is a potential problem and a reliance rule
serves a useful function in limiting it. The benefit of the reliance rule in
generating an efficient quantity ordered, given the (inefficient) level of
breach anticipated, must be balanced against the benefit of the expectation rule in generating an efficient level of breach given the (inefficient)
quantity ordered.
In establishing these results, I have deliberately avoided many of the
complications associated with the issue of damages for breach, both in the
real world and in the existing literature. My purpose was to show that
even in simple cases the conventional analysis omitted an essential point
and, as a result, reached a conclusion that was, in many situations, incorrect.
What do these results imply about how an efficient legal system would
deal with breach of contract? The clearest implication is that the presumption in favor of expectation damages should be limited to cases in which
the contract is formed in a competitive market with symmetric information between buyer and seller. Beyond that, the most one can say is that
an expectation rule is a solution to the problem of inefficient breach and a
reliance rule a solution to the problem of inefficient purchase. Which is
more appropriate for a particular contract will depend on which problem
is more likely to be serious-a matter that courts may or may not be
competent to judge.
APPENDIX A
DAMAGE RULES UNDER MONOPOLY: THE FORMAL ANALYSIS

We consider the choice between reliance and expectation rules in the case of a
single-price monopoly. The consumer faces two states of the world, 1 and 2, with
probabilities (1 - p) and p. In state i, his marginal value for the good is MVi.

Reliance equals zero. 27 Marginal cost is constant at MC, fixed cost is zero. We
assume
MVI(Q) = A - BQ; MV 2 (Q) = A - E - BQ; A, B, E > 0.
27 Here and in Appendix B, although I am analyzing the transformed problem (reliance
0), I drop the asterisk and write MV1, 2 instead of MV*. 2 for purposes of simplicity.
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We define
=

(I - p)E/B; Q,

-

(A -

MC -

E)IB,

MV, = A - BQ/(l - p),
MVh

A - BQ - pE,

-

(I - p)(A - BQ) + pMC.

MV,

As shown earlier, D,(P), the inverse function of MV,,(Q) (quantity as a function of
price rather than marginal value as a function of quantity), is the demand curve
under a reliance rule for Q < Q,; Db(P) is the demand curve under a reliance rule
for Q > Q, and is also the demand curve under an expectation rule for Q < Qe; and
D,(P) is the demand curve under an expectation rule for Q > Q. As earlier, Q is
the quantity consumed under a reliance rule but the quantity ordered under an
expectation rule.
Profit will be maximized where MR = MC. We therefore define
Q*:MRa(Qa) = A

2BQ*/(l -p)

-

Qb:MRb(Q*) = (A
Qc:MR,(QC) = [(I

- 2BQ,
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= MC;

Q* = (I

= MC;

Q* = (A

MC)/2B;

-p)(A
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-
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-

MC;

pE)/2B;

Q* = (A - MC)/2B.
We wish to discover the value of MC such that, under a reliance rule, the producer
will be indifferent between producing to the left of Q, on MV,, or to the right of Q,
on MVb; we will call it MC,b. Defining TR,,.b,,. as the integral of MR,,.h., we have,
for MC = MCab,
B(Q, -

Qa)I(1

-

p) = TRa(Q*) - TR,,(Q,)

= TRb(Q ) - TR(Qr) = B(Q
.(Q,
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-
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I
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-p,

[(A - MC,,,
2
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pE)
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)

With a little algebraic manipulation, this yields
.*.MCb = A - E(l + /i -p)
The analysis is shown, in graphical form, in Figure 5. We define Q*(MC) as the
profit-maximizing quantity for a producer under a reliance rule. If MC > MC,,
then Q* = Q*; if MC < MCab then Q* = Q.
Next we wish to discover the value of MC such that, under an expectation rule,
the producer will be indifferent between producing to the left of Q, on MVb or to
the right of Q, on MV,; we will call it MCb,. We have, for MC = MCb,,

B(Qe - Q*)

2

= TRb(Q*) -

TRb(Q,)

= B(l - p)(Q*
(Q, .. 2(A

- E-

MCb)(+V

= TR,(Q*) - TR,(Q,)

-Q,)2,

Q ,) = (Q*)(A
= (A

Q)

V1 - p,

MCa) V
-

- p + A

MC,,b)(I + VT -p)
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A

Expectation Damages
p=l/ 2

.
M]Vt
I1__

FIGURE 6.-The analysis of a monopoly selling under a rule of expectation damages, as
modeled in Appendix A. Curves MVb and MRb are shown only for values of Q to the left of
Q,; MV, and MR, are shown only for values of Q to the right of Q,. The demand curve and
the resulting marginal revenue curve faced by the monopolist are identical to the parts of
MVb,

and MRb., shown.

which simplifies to
= A - E(I +

MCb

VV -P)

= MC,,b.

The analysis is shown in Figure 6. For A - pE > MC > MC,b we therefore have
Q* = Q*, Q* = Q,; for MC < MC,,h we have Q* = Q,, Q* = Q*. For MC > A -

pE,

Q* = Q, Q* = 0.

We next wish to find out which rule is superior-which leads to a higher total of
consumer surplus plus profit. We have, for the case MC > MC,,,
(NB +

'7T)r

Q MV,(Q) -

BQ, 2

MC dQ =

_ 3(1 -p)

Q

MVb(Q) -

BQ *2B

(A

MC)Q*

_ MC) 2 ,

8B

2(1 - p)
(NB + IT)e =

(A -

MC dQ = (A

-

MC - pE)Qb

3

- (A - MC -pE) 2 ,
8B
2
V-1 -p (A - MC) > A - MC - pE.
so reliance is superior
(A - MC) = A - MC
Substituting in our value for MC,,, we find that V1 -p
- pEfor MC = MCa,,,SsoVI - p (A - MC) > A - MC - 28pEfor MC > MCab. It
follows that the reliance rule is superior for MC > MC,,b

28 The analysis does not apply to MC > A - pE, but the conclusion does. Expectation
leads to no output, no consumption, no profit, and no surplus, so reliance, which leads to
positive output,,is superior.
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For MC

< MCab:

(MVa - MC)dQ +

(NB + wr)r =

=

(MVb -

2

+

p )p

MC) dQ

-

2

=p [(A

=- i[ 30
2B

B (Q*

MC)(Q*-

-

-Q)

-MC

E)Qe

- MC) 2
44

+_

((A

-MG)
2

-MG4)

(NB +

8B

- Q2)
Qe)]

j+(2
])[(A

-MC)

-2E(A

2
+

E2)I

X

T)r

2
+ pE - 2pE(A _ MC) + 3pE(A

-

2

2

(I

(NB + Tr)e 2

-

BQ '

[

-MC)
4

(l

- Q,)

2B

(MV,

MC) dQ +

+( - p) [(A

.(A

E2

2

pE)Qe

MC

= (A

BQ'2 -pE(Q
2

2
MC-pE) +P(1 - p)E;

I2 [3(A-

f.

MC)dQ

-

BQ2
2

- BQ

= (A - MC -pE)Qb

(NB + 'rre

(MVb

BQ,'
2(1 - p)

= (A - MC)Qb-

=

J

-

2

MC)

3P2 E2
4

(

p)E2

[(A - MC) 2 - (I - p)E 2 ].

If we set MC = MCab, this last term is positive, so expectation is superior to
reliance. The same is true a fortiori for MC < MC,,h. It follows that reliance
dominates for MC > MC,,b and expectation dominates for MC - MC,,b.
APPENDIX B
DAMAGE RULES UNDER PERFECT COMPETITION: THE FORMAL ANALYSIS

We consider the choice between reliance and expectation damage rules in a
perfectly competitive market with asymmetric information. We assume, as before, marginal values MV 1.2 , reliance R, probability of the event leading to breach
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p. Marginal cost is MC, with probability p,, MCb with probability pb,pP + Pb = 1,
MCb < MCa. The consumer knows marginal cost before the goods are purchased;
the producer does not. Since the industry is perfectly competitive, average profit
is zero.
The analysis of consumer behavior in Part II applies to this situation as well; the
initial problem may be converted into an equivalent problem with transformed
marginal-value curves and zero reliance.
I must now introduce explicitly a constraint which was earlier ignored. Under
expectation damages, a breaching consumer must make the seller as well off as if
there had been no breach. If the seller's expected profits from completing the
contract are negative, a literal interpretation of the expectation rule would imply
negative damages; the buyer who breaches part or all of the contract receives not
only a refund but an additional payment as a reward for breaching. While that is a
literal interpretation of the definition of expectation damages, it is not one that
a court would follow; you
cannot recover on the grounds that your breach
29
benefited the other party.
We therefore impose the additional constraint that damage payments must be
nonnegative. In the case of imperfect competition, this constraint is never binding
since the monopolist never chooses a price at which his profits are negative. But in
the case of asymmetric information, the seller may find that, ex post, he is receiving negative profits and would be better off if the buyer breached. So expectation
damages equal P -

(MC - R) only for P -- MC - R; otherwise they are zero.

When we transform the problem from MV 1,2 , R to MV1, 2 , 0, we do not change P
or MC, so the constraint still contains the old value of reliance (R). The usual
definition of expectation damages applies only for P ->MC - R. In the analysis
below, I assume R large enough so that we can ignore the problem of negative
damages.
RELIANCE

Figure 7 shows the relevant curves. The seller charges a price Pr. The consumer
purchases a quantity Q1. If the event occurs which lowers his marginal value
curve to MV 2 , he breaches a quantity Q, - Q2 and accepts delivery on a quantity
Q2. Under the reliance rule, the actual value of MC is of no importance to the
buyer since it does not affect the damages he must pay for breaching, so neither Q,
nor Q2 depends on it.

From the zero-profit condition, we have
-

[(1 - P)Q1 + PQ2][Pr .'. P, = PaMC,

paMCa - PbMCb] = 0,
-

PbMCb.

29 Negative damages could occur through bargaining. The buyer who wants to breach

realizes that doing so will benefit the seller, so he threatens to take delivery unless paid not
to. That situation would not arise if expectation damages applied in both directions; the

seller could initiate breach and pay damages of zero, since the buyer would not be injured.
But it might arise if that solution was blocked by a contract specifying liquidated damages or
by a performance rule applied to the seller, or if the court was unable to observe the event
that made the buyer wish to breach. In such situations one might observe an extreme version
of the problem of inefficient ordering under asymmetric information, with the high-cost
buyer ordering units he knows he will not want in order to be bribed not to take delivery.
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FIGURE 7.-Consumer surplus with reliance (A) and expectation (B) rules under the model
of Appendix B.

Since there is no penalty for breach (we are dealing with the transformed problem,
so reliance is zero), the consumer can pick Q, and Q2 separately to maximize his
surplus from MV 1 and MV 2 . He does so by choosing the values for which MV, (Q,)
P, = MV 2 (Q 2). The result is shown in Figure 7.
EXPECTATION

Under expectation damages, the situation is more complicated. Damages are
equal to P - MC. Since the buyer knows the value of MC in advance, he will buy
different quantities in case a (high marginal cost) than in case b. I accordingly
define Q , Qq, Q2, and Q2 as the corresponding quantities. We have
Net benefit = (value minus price in situation 1) + (value minus price in situation 2) - (damage payment)
(1 - p){pa[TVI(Q") - PQ6] + pb[TVI(Qb) _PeQbl}
PQ]}
+ p{p,[TV 2 (QO) - PeQ] + Pb[TV 2(Q 22 )
- {pa[Q
- Q,][Pe - MC,] + Ph[Q - Q-][P

= (1 - p){pa[TVI(Q1') + pb[TVI(Qb) - (Pe +

(P, + I P-p
t

(Pe -

MC]}

MC,))Qa']}

(pe _ MC.))QT]

1-p
+ p{pa[TV2 (Q ')

-MCaQ]

+ ph[TV 2 (Q 2 )
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Q"2, and Q2 gives us

Maximizing net benefit with respect to QI
MVI(Q )

Pe + 1 p

(Pe

.-. MVa(Q)--- MV(Qo) + 1
MVI(Qb'1TPe

.M b(Qb)

+

-

-

MCa)1,

p- MC
P

MV, (Qb')+

-

[I +

Pe.

MCb)j

Mb

1+1~p-

MV 2 (Q2) = MC .
MV 2 (Qb)

= MCb.

The zero-profit condition is
IT = P.QI[Pe -

MCa] + PbQ I[Pe - MCb] = 0,

•

= [pQ'MC.
PaPe
+ PbQ IMCb]/[p1Q'1 + pbQl]I > ,
The final inequality follows from the fact that Q0 > Qb. The customer knows
that his damage payment in case of breach is lower when marginal cost is higher,
so he orders more units. Since the seller knows that high-cost customers order
more than low-cost customers, he must set price above the average of MC, and
MCb in order to cover cost. Under reliance, high-cost and low-cost customers
order the same amount, so price is simply the average of MCa and MCb.
The result is shown in Figure 7. The lightly hatched area A is the increased
surplus due to using a reliance rule; the diagonally hatched area B is the increased
surplus due to an expectation rule. If A > B, the reliance rule is superior; if A < B,
the expectation rule is superior.
Looking at the figure, it is clear where the advantages of each rule come from.
The expectation rule produces the optimal level of breach, giving a gain in surplus
of B, but it produces an inefficient pattern of ordering (more ordered when cost is
higher), giving a loss in surplus of A.
In drawing the figure, I assumed for simplicity Q" > Q' and Qb > Qb, avoiding
corner solutions. I also assumed Q"] - Q1. If Q' < Q, then the area above MV,
between Q" and Q, represents negative surplus. It is straightforward to show that
A is still positive in this situation, so the reliance rule still results in a more
efficient quantity ordered.
All-or-Nothing Breach
One interesting special case occurs when MV 2 - 0. If the event occurs, all units
of the good are useless to the buyer, so under either damage rule he refuses to take
delivery of any of them. Area B then disappears, making the reliance rule unambiguously superior. The advantage of the expectation rule, as pointed out before,
is that it leads to an efficient level of breach. In this situation both rules lead to the
efficient level of breach, so the expectation rule has no advantage. This is just the
reverse of what happens under perfect discriminatory pricing or symmetric
knowledge (under perfect competition); in those situations both rules lead to an efficient quantity ordered, so the expectation rule is unambiguously superior.
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